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According to the Government Accountability Office, 68 percent of foreign 
corporations operating in the U.S. did not pay a single dollar in federal income tax between 
1998 and 2005; during this period, almost two-thirds of U.S. firms also avoided paying tax 
(GAO, 2008). This is despite the fact that these corporations made trillions of dollars in sales 
revenue at the time.  Though much of this is due to legal tax avoidance, each year, the 
federal budget loses hundreds of billions of dollars due to illegal tax noncompliance (IRS, 
2006). In countries with higher levels of corruption and weaker adherence to laws, this 
problem may be even worse. It is estimated that tax evasion costs the world’s poorest 
countries around US$900bn each year in lost tax revenue (Mathiason, 2008).  
This paper studies the link between corruption norms overseas and tax evasion in 
the U.S.  Specifically, we ask whether foreign controlled corporations from more corrupt 
countries are more likely to evade U.S. taxes.  We answer this question by linking the results 
of over 25,000 IRS corporate tax audits from 1996 to 2007 with corruption measures from 
the foreign owner’s country of residence. Our paper connects the corporate tax evasion 
literature with research on the role of cultural norms in illegal activities.  
The economics literature on tax evasion is small but expanding.  Its basic framework 
for analysis dates back to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which was built on a seminal 
model of crime by Becker (1968). In this framework, taxpayers choose an optimal of tax 
evasion given the level of penalty, probability of getting caught, and their own level of risk 
aversion.
1 To analyze the role of corporate governance in tax evasion, this framework has 
been embedded in a principal-agent structure. Using this approach, Slemrod (2004) argues 
                                                 
1 This framework has been extended to incorporate different issues for individual tax evasion. For a review of 
this literature see Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) or Sandmo (2005). 3 
 
that small firms tend to behave more like individuals than do large firms.  This is because an 
owner of a small firm may make tax reporting decisions directly.  In large firms the tax 
planning and reporting decisions are often delegated.  In this case owners must provide 
incentives for their tax directors to evade. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) demonstrate that a 
firm’s principal could alter compensation contracts with his agents to induce tax evasion on 
his behalf, though such arrangements might not always be the case. Further, Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) point out that high-powered incentives for agents may not lead to higher 
tax evasion for the principal if tax evasion and diversion of rents are complementary 
activities. 
Empirical tests of theoretical models of corporate tax evasion have been limited due 
to a general lack of data. Only a handful of studies measure tax evasion using differences 
between income reported to the IRS and to other parties, or IRS audit data.  Desai and 
Dharmapala (2006) creatively use the difference between income reported to the IRS and 
investors (not attributable to accounting accruals) to show a negative relationship between 
incentive compensation and tax sheltering among corporations with poor governance. In 
contrast, Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2007) use audit data to find evidence that strong 
executive compensation incentives are associated with increased tax noncompliance. 
However, the authors do not find evidence for a relationship between commonly used 
measures of corporate governance and tax evasion, as Desai and Dharmapala (2006) do. 
Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod also suggest that corporate tax noncompliance relative to total 
income (or total assets) may be U-shaped.   That is, tax evasion is high among small 
businesses but decreases among medium-sized firms, then increases again among large firms. 
Hanlon, Mill and Slemrod find that private firms tend to engage in tax evasion more than 4 
 
public firms, who have the incentive to report higher profit.  However, they treat this 
evidence as tentative.  
While the economics literature focuses on the economic and financial motivations 
for tax evasion, there is an emerging literature on the role of culture in illegal activities. For 
example, a recent study examines illegal parking by United Nations’ diplomats in New York 
City. Fisman and Miguel (2007) find that the corruption norms in the diplomats’ home 
countries strongly influence their propensity to engage in illegal parking in NYC. The 
stationing of United Nations’ diplomats in NYC provides a natural experiment for testing 
the role of cultural norms because diplomats from different countries (with different norms) 
face the same set of economic incentives regarding illegal parking in one city. While there is 
not yet similar research relating to tax evasion, cultural factors have been argued to be 
important in shaping behavior in this illicit activity. Frey (1997) proposes that taxpayers pay 
taxes because of both extrinsic motivation (e.g., worries about penalties for tax evasion) and 
intrinsic motivation (e.g., the willingness to contribute to a public good). The latter is shaped 
by cultural parameters such as personal values and social norms, and there is some evidence 
for this influence from survey data. Slemrod (2003) finds that survey responders who said 
they trust the government tend also report paying higher taxes (see also Torgler (2003) and 
Hanousek and Palda (2004)). Joulfaian (2000) shows that executives who underreport their 
personal taxable income also tend to run firms that have higher incidences of tax 
noncompliance. It is, however, unclear whether this relationship is driven by cultural norms 
or personal risk preferences. 
In this paper we test the influence of corruption norms on corporate tax evasion, an 
important illegal behavior exercised by corporations. Fisman and Miguel (2007) found that 
social norms influence illicit behavior by individuals, but the extent to which norms affect 5 
 
corporate behavior is an open question, both conceptually and empirically. On the one hand, 
social norms may affect corporations because they affect the individuals who control 
corporations. People who personally tolerate or participate in corruption may be likely to 
accept or encourage illegal activities collectively. On the other hand, corporations are 
institutions rationalized to maximize profit, and therefore they may be expected to respond 
only to institutional incentives such as audit probabilities and expected penalties. These 
opposing arguments motivate a test for the power of social norms in determining the 
behavior of economic organizations such as corporations. 
We utilize a new dataset of 25,541 IRS audits of foreign-owned corporations for the 
12 years from 1996 to 2007. Corporate tax evasion by foreign-owned corporations in the 
U.S. provides a natural experiment because it subjects firms with different home-country 
norms to the same legal and enforcement incentives in the United States. In these firms, 
foreign owners may handle tax filling directly (especially in small firms) or influence their tax 
staff (especially in large firms). This setting allows us to estimate the influence of home-
country corruption norms of a firm on its tax evasion behavior. We measure a firm’s tax 
evasion using the ratio of IRS-determined tax deficiency over total income. The IRS-
determined tax deficiency is the amount of positive adjustment to the firm’s tax liability 
following audit.
2  Corruption norms in home countries are measured using the well-known 
Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International. Given the important role of 
firms’ size (pointed out by Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007)), we examine the effect of 
corruption norms on tax evasion for different firms’ size groups. Although the selection of 
                                                 
2 Note that this is the IRS recommended adjustment and not the actual amount the tax payer remits after any 
appeals and/or legal proceedings. The line between tax evasion and tax avoidance is often ambiguous. We do 
not argue that the tax adjustment we use in this paper is strictly tax evasion, but it is perhaps the best measure 
for tax evasion available to date. Throughout the paper, we will use the terms tax adjustment, deficiency and 
evasion interchangeably. 6 
 
firms for auditing is not random, we are able to address this selection issue by using the 
Discriminant Information Function (DIF) score, which IRS computes to determine the 
likelihood of auditing change in tax liability following audit.  The IRS then uses the DIF 
score in its audit selection decisions. 
The results are straightforward. High corruption norms are strongly associated with 
increased tax evasion among small and medium firms. As the firms’ size increases, this effect 
diminishes gradually. As an illustration, we find that a firm with annual revenue and total 
assets equal to the sample mean ($20 million and $50 million, respectively) and with an 
owner from a country with Nigeria-level corruption, on average, exceeds a similar firm from 
Sweden in tax noncompliance by about $64,371 (equivalent to about 8% of mean total 
corporation income tax for firms who evade).  However, as firm assets become very large 
(above $102 million), the difference in their tax evasion behavior becomes negligible. The 
association between corruption norms and tax deficiencies is quite robust to controlling for a 
number of possibly confounding covariates, including a country’s GDP per capita, trade 
relations, distance from the United States, the firm’s net income, and even country fixed 
effects. These results provide evidence supporting the view that cultural norms can shape 
corporate behavior, as well as the view that large corporations (which are likely to have more 
delegated tax reporting) attenuate the influence of individual norms. 
Our paper also studies the effectiveness of enforcement policies aimed at corporate 
tax evasion. From 1996 to 2007, the United States implemented several measures to deal 
with corporate tax evasion. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 required CEOs of publicly 
traded firms to sign off on their company’s tax return and increased the penalties for non-
compliance, while the introduction of Schedule M-3 on Form 1120 in 2004 required firms 
with more than $10 million in total assets to provide much more detail on book-tax 7 
 
differences than previously.  During the same period, the IRS also increased tax audit rates 
significantly in certain years and areas. Our estimates indicate that at least some of these 
enforcement efforts led to a significant decrease in tax evasion among foreign-controlled 
firms, but were less effective against this misbehavior by firms with owners from corrupt 
countries. The results indicate the resistance of corruption norms against legal enforcement. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe corporate income tax 
returns, the auditing process and the data we use. Section 3 presents our estimation of the 
effect of corruption on tax evasion. Section 4 reports the estimation of the impact of 
enforcement programs. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1 Corporate audit, tax, and firm characteristics 
Corporations with operations or income in the United States are required to file 
Form 1120, the U.S. Corporation Income Tax Form, annually.  On this form, the 
corporation’s tax preparer reports to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the employer 
identification number (or EIN) of the corporation, and the amount of income, deductions, 
taxable income, and tax owed for the corporation in that tax year, among other items.   
Attached to this form are a number of additional supporting schedules.  The most 
important of these for the present study is Schedule K, which collects descriptive 
information about the corporation.  On this schedule, line 7 asks whether one foreign 
person owned at least 25% of the corporation
3 at any time during the year.  If the answer to 
                                                 
3 Specifically, Schedule K asks whether the person owned at least 25% of the total voting power of all classes of 
the corporation’s stock entitled to vote, or at least 25% of the total value of all classes of the corporation’s 
stock.   8 
 
this question is yes, the corporation must report the percentage owned by that individual, 
and the owner’s country of residence.
4  We will refer to companies that answered yes on line 
7 of Schedule K as a “foreign-controlled corporation.”  
Each year, about 2,000 returns of foreign-controlled corporations are selected for an 
examination, or audit.
5  The IRS uses a formula that measures the likelihood that a change in 
tax liability will be found upon examination, or the Discriminant Information Function, to 
determine the probability of audit for each firm. Larger firms are much more likely to be 
audited than smaller firms. Approximately 0.8-1 percent of returns of small firms are 
selected.  Among large firms, additional returns are selected for audit based on the 
characteristics of the firms.  In total, approximately 15-20% of very large corporations’ 
returns are selected.
6   
During the audit process, a team generally conducts an initial interview followed by a 
tour of the business.  Subsequently, the audit team meets with the business to discuss the 
plan of the audit and the timeframe for the audit, request documents, and notify the business 
of proposed adjustments.  The examiners then perform an investigation, and conclude 
whether any additional taxes and penalties are owed.  If the team concludes additional 
amounts are owed, the taxpayer may either agree to pay the additional amounts, or submit an 
appeal.  Once this is done, from the point of view of the audit team, the case is entered as 
being closed in the Audit Information Management System (AIMS). 
                                                 
4 If there are multiple such owners, this information is reported for each owner.  However, the IRS data we use 
only lists the information for the largest owner.  Owners are any “person”, by which the IRS means any 
controlling entity; individual, estate, trust, partnership, or corporation.  The IRS does not collect data on entity 
type of the owner.  For individual owners the foreign country code is the owner’s country of residence.  For 
other entities, the country code is that of the country in which the entity is incorporated, organized, created, or 
administered.  In the case of a holding company that is part of a chain between a U.S. subsidiary or the ultimate 
foreign parent, the country data may be related to the holding company and not the ultimate parent.  The data 
do not allow us to identify entities along such chains, only the immediate controlling entity. 
5 See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/fy_2009_enforcement_results.pdf 
6 For additional information on how returns are selected for audit, see U.S. GAO (1995). 9 
 
To create the dataset used in this study, we begin with data from the IRS’s Audit 
Information Management System.  These data contain the results of all IRS corporate audits 
that were closed between 1996 and 2010.  From this dataset, we pull the recommended 
change in tax after the audit.  We will refer to this variable as the “Audit Adjustment” in 
what follows. 
To the audit data, we merge corporate tax return data from the IRS’s Compliance 
Data Warehouse (CDW).  The CDW consists of variables from the universe of tax returns 
(both corporate and individual) filed from 1996 onward.  From the corporate CDW, we 
draw tax return information for each firm-year that is present in the AIMS dataset, including 
variables denoting the tax year of the return, the EIN and company name, whether a 
company has a foreign owner with at least a 25% ownership share, and which country the 
largest foreign owner is from (to indicate a foreign controlled corporation).  In addition, we 
use variables that identify the primary industry of the firm, total assets (which are taken from 
Item D on the front page of the 1120), and total income (which is line 11 on the front page 
of the 1120).  Finally, we use an indicator for whether the firm claimed a foreign tax credit or 
filed Form 5471, showing that the firm has multinational operations.   
To these data, we merge information from the Compustat North America and 
Compustat Global databases, which enable us to identify publicly traded firms.
7 
If we included all audited firms in our sample, the sample would be dominated by 
firms that are owned by U.S. citizens.  Since this paper focuses on how corruption norms in 
foreign countries affects taxpaying in the United States, including all such firms might 
attenuate the estimated impact of our corruption variable.  So, to focus on cross country 
variation in corruption norms outside the United States, we include a firm in our sample 
                                                 
7 Compustat Global covers approximately 98% of the world’s market capitalization.  As a result, there may be 
some firms that we wrongly consider as non-public, but the number is likely to be quite small. 10 
 
only if the firm is observed to be foreign controlled at least one year during our sample 
period.
8 
2.2 Cross-country data 
Corruption measures. We use the annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published 
by Transparency International as our primary measure of corruption of the owner’s home 
country.   Measuring the corruption level of a country is difficult and all current measures 
have certain advantages and drawbacks, although they tend to correlate strongly to each 
other. We chose the CPI because it is commonly acceptable and widely used in corruption 
research. This index is computed annually based on subjective evaluations of experts drawn 
from 16 surveys worldwide, and is used in a number of other studies
9 (See Figure 1). 
Countries with higher levels of corruption have lower values on the 10-point CPI scale. To 
make interpretation easier, we reverse the CPI scale. Specifically, we subtract the CPI from 
10 to obtain our corruption measure.
10 Thus, in our analysis, a higher corruption index 
corresponds to higher levels of corruption.  
As an alternative measure of corruption, we also use the World Bank’s Control of 
Corruption Indicator. This aggregate indicator gathers opinion data from several surveys of 
firms, residents and experts in developed and developing country, and is also a popular 
measure of corruption in practical and academic studies. 
Other country-level characteristics. To ensure that tax evasion is driven by the owner’s 
home country’s corruption norms and not economic incentives, we control for a number of 
additional country-level characteristics, using data from various sources.  The GDP per 
                                                 
8 The resulting sample will include some U.S. owned firms, but only if ownership changed to or from a foreign 
national during our sample period. 
9 For example, see Fisman (2001), Djankov et al. (2002), and Barth et al. (2009). 
10 Other studies have also reversed the CPI to make it more intuitive. For examples, see Fisman and Miguel 
(2007) and D’Souza (2010). 11 
 
capita data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, while distance to 
the U.S. is the weighted average distance between population centers in the country and the 
U.S., and is computed by the CEPII Research Center.  Bilateral trade data come from the 
U.S. Census Bureau.  Finally, data on foreign corporate tax rates and regimes comes from 
the OECD’s Tax Database and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.   
2.3 Data sample and statistics 
To create the estimation sample, we perform a couple of additional sample cuts.  
First, we drop S corporations (which do not pay tax at the entity level), regulated investment 
companies (RICs), and real estate investment trusts (REITs) from our analysis, as these types 
of entities receive much different tax treatment than regular C corporations.  Second, we 
exclude observations missing any variables used in the regression analysis.   
Throughout, all nominal values are deflated to 2009$.  To deal with outliers, all 
monetary variables are 90% Winsorized.  Winsorization of the data is necessary to deal with 
outliers.  The tax data we use are not edited in any way by IRS and thus data entry and 
calculation errors by the filers or the IRS agent keying in the data are not uncommon.
11   
Table 1 presents sample means for the variables used in our regression analysis.  The 
first column presents means for all companies in the sample, the second column presents 
means for corporations with owners from OECD countries, and the third column presents 
means for corporations with owners from non-OECD countries.   Adjustments average 
almost $88,776 among all foreign-controlled firms, and on average amount to about 0.67% 
of total income. Approximately 12.1% of all firms are publicly traded, and 28.4% of all firms 
have multinational operations (indicated by claiming a foreign tax credit or ownership of a 
controlled foreign corporation on Form 5471).  Wholesale, manufacturing and finance form 
                                                 
11 Table 6 below shows the robustness of the results to various levels of Winsorization. 12 
 
the three largest industries in our sample, followed by professional firms, retail, transport and 
information.  
 [Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on audit adjustment amounts.  Our sample 
contains 25,541 firm-year observations of firms who underwent an audit between 1996 and 
2007.
12  Adjustments following audits include recommended changes to taxes, interest and 
penalties.   Among all audited firms, 42.6% had a positive audit adjustment, with a mean 
adjustment of $208,290, while 16.4% had a negative audit adjustment, with a mean of 
$53,370.
13  
[Table 2 about here] 
In the raw data, there is a strong correlation between firms’ size and the tax 
deficiencies.  Figure 2 displays a scatter plot and fitted values for mean audit adjustments 
scaled by total income for firm in each percentile group by total assets.  The data show that 
larger firms (measured by total assets) tend to have smaller audit adjustments (as a fraction 
of total income).  There are several potential explanations for the relationship, including 
higher audit rates for large firms.  Whatever the cause, the link between firms’ size and tax 
deficiencies influences our empirical approach described in the next section. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Before discussing the parameterized model, it is useful to look at raw correlations.  
Figure 3 shows a scatter plot of mean audit adjustments (scaled by total income) and mean 
CPI for countries in our sample.  One can clearly see a positive relationship between levels 
                                                 
12 These numbers reflect exclusions for missing data on any regression variables. 
13 Negative audit adjustments suggest that a non-trivial fraction of firms over-report their tax liability.  These 
cases may be errors or strategic behavior to reduce the likelihood of a costly audit.  We find that those with 
positive adjustments are slightly larger firms than average and more likely to have multinational operations and 
be publicly traded.  Otherwise these firms appear very similar to others in the sample. 13 
 
of corruption and scaled tax deficiencies.  Figure 4 cuts the raw data in a different manner.  
Each line shows the relationship between the level of corruption in the foreign controller’s 
home country and the mean amount of scaled audit adjustment for firms in a particular 
quartile (measured by total assets.  For each quartile, we see a positive relationship in the 
amount of evasion as the corruption level in the foreign owner’s country increases.  The 
level of evasion is highest, and the relationship between corruption and evasion strongest, in 
the first two quartiles.  This graph shows the importance that firm size plays in determining 
the extent to which corruption norms influence corporate tax evasion.   
The next section explores the relationship between corruption norms and tax 
evasion, testing whether it continues to hold after controlling for important covariates and 
sources of bias. 
[Figure 3 & 4 about here] 
 
3. Empirical strategies and results 
3.1 Baseline specification with constant effect 
Our empirical approach follows Fisman and Miguel (2007) and Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod 
(2007). We exploit the fact that firms have owners from different countries and thus have 
different corruption norms, but are subject to the same legal incentives in the U.S. We 
hypothesize that the owners of these firms may either influence the management of the firm, 
or manage the firm themselves, in which case the norms and customs of these owners would 
be likely to be manifest in the firms’ behavior.  In particular, firms with owners from more 
corrupt countries, where not following de jure rules is more acceptable, will show a higher 
propensity to engage in illicit activities.   14 
 
In the first and most parsimonious specification, we assume that corruption norms 
have a constant effect on tax evasion across firms. Our regression equation is of the 
following form: 
 
          
      
 
 , 
∗ 100                ,                         ,  
																																				                                ,           , 																								 1  
 
where i denotes the firm, t denotes the year, Deficiency measures the change in tax liability 
following an audit, Revenue is total income of the firm,
14  Corruption is the measure of 
corruption in the foreign owner’s home country, the control variable vector FirmCharacteristic 
contains characteristics of the firm including the log of total assets, industry dummies, and 
indicator variables for public or multinational status. X is the vector of other control 
variables. The parameters    are year dummies to control for macroeconomic fluctuations 
and other factors that contemporaneously affect all firms.  
In this type of empirical analysis, one must be concerned about three possible 
sources of bias: reverse causality, omitted variable bias, and selection bias. Fortunately, in 
model (1), reverse causality is not a problem because a firm’s tax evasion in the U.S. is 
unlikely to change the general corruption level in its home country.  
Omitted variable bias, on the other hand, may be a problem if there are some 
unobserved factors included in the disturbance term ε that are correlated with Corruption. The 
fact that this study analyzes only firms that operate in the U.S. eliminates many such 
confounding factors related to the firm’s legal and business environment, which often 
                                                 
14 Using total income or total assets as the measure of scale yields very similar results. In this paper, we will 
report specifications using total revenue as the measure of scale because reported total revenue tends to be 
more stable. Because total assets do not affect tax liability, the quality of these data are more suspect than 
income measures.   15 
 
challenge cross-country studies.
15 Nevertheless, besides factors in the firm’s environment, 
there may remain factors in the owner’s home country that both correlate with Corruption and 
induce the firm to evade tax in the U.S. For example, one might argue that firms with 
owners from poorer countries may have higher marginal utility for income and therefore 
have a stronger incentive to evade tax in the U.S. Or, one could argue that firms that come 
from countries with fewer economic ties to the United States, or whose home countries are 
further from the United States, might have a stronger incentive to evade tax or have less 
knowledge of U.S. accounting standards (which could lead to larger measured evasion).  To 
address these concerns, following Fisman and Miguel (2007), we control for GDP per capita 
and other country-level characteristics that could possibly offer such a link. For the same 
reason, we also control for the net income of the firm, as it may affect the owner’s marginal 
utility of income. Further, we also include country fixed effects, which eliminate all concerns 
about any time-invariant factors unobservable at the country level. 
Finally, because IRS audits are not randomly assigned, sample selection is a potential 
concern. This has been acknowledged but not addressed in the existing studies using audit 
data. Fortunately, the IRS data provide us with the Discriminant Information Function 
System (DIF) score for each firm in the sample. The IRS computes this score to predict the 
potential of unreported income and uses it to select firms for auditing. IRS (2011) states that 
“IRS personnel screen the highest-scoring returns, selecting some for audit and identifying 
the items on these returns that are most likely to need review.” To effectively mitigate the 
sample selection issue, we include the firm’s DIF score in all of the specifications that 
follow. We also control for a range of other firms’ characteristics mentioned in the previous 
                                                 
15 It is true that the business environment may vary even within the U.S. However, this variation is much 
smaller than the variation across countries.  In case there is selection into different states (due to legal 
environment or local norms regarding illegal behavior) we have estimated specification with state fixed effects 
and found the results consistent with those presented in this paper. 16 
 
page since IRS auditors use DIF and these characteristics of firms to determine which firms 
to audit. Although this might not eliminate completely eliminate sample selection as a 
potential selection concern, we believe this should relieve most of it and is an improvement 
over other approaches in the literature.
16  
We censor the Deficiency variable at zero, as in Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007).  
There exist firms who realize decreases in tax liability following an audit, but we choose to 
treat them as having no adjustment since they likely had a reporting error against their 
favor.
17 Because the resulting data are censored, we use a Tobit model for all of the main 
specifications in this study. Alternative models including OLS and panel data methods are 
used as robustness checks and reported in Section 3.3.
  
In light of Hanlon, Mills, and Slemrod (2007) finding of a prominent relationship 
between firms’ size and tax evasion, it is useful to see if the effect of corruption norms varies 
across different firms’ size groups. Thus, in addition to using the full sample, we split the 
sample into four quartiles by firm asset size and run the analysis separately for each of these 
subsamples. 
If corruption norms increase tax evasion, we should expect the coefficient of 
Corruption  to be positive and significant. Table 3 shows the results of our baseline 
specification. Column 1 reports the results for the full sample (with 25,541 observations) 
while Columns 2-5 report the results for the four quartiles (around 6,385 observations each).  
In the full sample, the corruption measure has a positive and strongly significant effect on 
tax evasion. This effect is positive and significant separately for Quartile 1 and 2; negative 
                                                 
16 One might be concerned that the foreign investors that invest in the U.S. may be different from the typical 
domestic investors in that foreign country. We do not argue against this. However, our study aims to compare 
foreign investors in the U.S., not typical investors in different countries. 
17 It is also possible that these firms overpaid in hopes of reducing the probability of incurring the costs 
associated with an audit.  In either case, treating firms with negative adjustments to tax liability as having no 
change is not inappropriate nor does it lead to substantial differences in the results. 17 
 
but insignificant for Quartile 3, and negative and significant for Quartile 4.
18 The relationship 
between corruption and tax evasion appears monotonic in firms’ size, with the largest effect 
found in firms in the first quartile. The results suggest that the level of corruption in the 
owner’s home country may have a positive effect on tax evasion for small, but not large, 
firms.  
The coefficients of several covariates are also worth noting. Multinationals tend to 
evade more tax than single-national firms (Column 1). Public firms evade less than private 
ones. Tax evasion is most common in mining, construction, real estate, and education. It is 
least common in professional services, information, administrative services, and agriculture.  
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
3.2. Specification allowing the effect to vary with firms’ size  
The evidence for heterogeneous effects in Table 3 requires a specification that 
explicitly addresses the influence of corruption norms on tax evasion that varies with firms’ 
size. Thus, we run the following specification: 
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18 The negative coefficient may reflect the fact that big firms tend to be audited more frequently.  As a result, if 
a firm that is owned by someone from a corrupt country knows they are likely to be audited, they may think 
that the IRS will be more diligent in looking over their return.  As a result, they may be less aggressive in 
avoiding/evading taxes than an equivalent domestic firm would be. 18 
 
The main difference between (2) and (1) is the inclusion of an interaction term 
between Firmsize and Corruption. Firmsize is measured by total assets (instead of revenue to 
avoid having revenue on both sides of the equation). If the owner-country’s corruption 
norms influence tax evasion in corporation for only smaller firms, we should expect   	to be 
positive and α2 to be negative.  However, if this influence takes place only among larger 
firms, we should expect   to be insignificant and    to be positive.  
Table 4 reports the results for this specification. In Column 1, after we include 
Firmsize and its interaction with Corruption, the corruption measure shows a strong and 
positive effect on tax evasion, with an estimated coefficient of 0.756. The interaction 
between the Corruption and Firmsize, on the other hand, has a strong and negative effect on 
tax evasion, with an estimated coefficient of -0.041. To put these results in context, these 
coefficients suggest that a firm with mean assets and revenue and an owner from 
Afghanistan (with a CPI of 8.6 in 2010) would have an average scaled deficiency that is 
$61,531 higher than a similar firm with an owner from Germany (which has a CPI of 2.1).  
[Table 4 about here] 
To help with the interpretation of this specification, we use the estimates in Column 
1 to construct a 3-dimension graph showing the approximate predicted tax evasion as a 
function of owner-country’s corruption norms and firms’ size. Figure 5 shows that, at low 
levels of assets, firms with owners from more corrupt countries evade much more tax than 
firms whose owners come from less corrupt countries. However, this effect is only apparent 
among firms under a certain size. For example, a firm with $5 million in assets with an 
owner from a country with an Iraqi level of corruption (8.7) on average evades more tax 
than a similar firm with an owner from a country with a Singaporean level of corruption 
(0.7) by 1.43 percentage points of their annual revenue.  This amount represents a 19 
 
considerable fraction of the average tax amount that these firms pay. Holding the Iraqi 
corruption level constant, an increase in the level of assets reduces the propensity of firm to 
evade tax. For example, if the Iraqi-owned firm increases its assets from $5 million to $102 
million, its tax evasion also falls by roughly 1.43 percentage points of its annual revenue. At 
the assets of $102 million, the difference between the levels of tax evasion among the Iraqi 
and Singaporean firms is negligible. This interaction indicates that small size is a necessary 
condition for corruption norms to induce corporate tax evasion. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Columns 2 through 6 add a number of variables, the omission of which might 
confound the effect of the CPI variable. The first of such confounding factors is the home 
country’s GDP per capita. It might be possible that owners from poorer countries have higher 
marginal utility with respect to money and thus are more likely to evade tax. In Column 2, 
we add the log of the home country’s GDP per capita and its interaction with Firmsize, exactly 
as we include CPI to see if GDP per capita is behind the effect of CPI. Second, it might also 
possible that owners from countries with greater economic ties with the U.S. tend to follow 
the U.S. business practices more closely. In Column 3 we add the log of the amount of 
bilateral trade with the United States and its interaction with Firmsize.  Third, it might be that 
owners from countries with shorter distance to the U.S. share a greater exchange with 
America in various social dimensions. Thus, in Column 4 we add the log of the distance of 
the owner’s home country from the United States.  These variables are used to test whether 
the economic and geographic characteristics of the owner’s home country, instead of its 
corruption level, are the true determinants of the firm’s propensity to evade tax.  An 
additional concern with the specification in Column 1 is that firms with less net income 
might be less likely to evade, since they have less of a tax base from which they can evade.  20 
 
On the other hand, firms with less net income might engage in more evasion in order to 
increase lean profit margins.  If countries CPI’s are systematically correlated with net 
income, then the estimated effect of corruption of the owner’s home country may be biased.  
In Column 5, we add to the base specification a measure of the firm’s net income and its 
interaction with Firmsize.  Finally, in Column 6, we estimate a specification that includes all 
of the possibly confounding factors and their interactions with firms’ size.   
Across these specifications, it seems that firms from richer countries, countries with 
weaker trade ties with the U.S., countries with a shorter distance to the U.S. tend to evade 
more tax, but that these effects diminish as the size of the firm increases. In addition, firms 
with lower net income tend to evade more tax, but this effect also diminishes as firm size 
increases.  However, comparing Columns (2) through (6) to Column (1), the coefficient on 
the corruption index remains relatively stable, varying between 0.698 and 0.963, while the 
interaction between the CPI and firms’ size varies only between -0.037 and -0.059.  In all 
specifications, both of these coefficients are highly significant.  The fact that the coefficients 
remain steady and significant suggests that the effect of corruption is not being driven by 
GDP per capita, trade, or the distance from the United States.  Across all of specifications, it 
is smaller firms from countries with higher corruption indexes that are associated with larger 
tax deficiencies. 
Our results may still be biased, however, if there are some unobservable country 
level characteristics that are correlated both with the corruption measure and tax evasion.  
To examine whether such a concern is affecting our results, we add country fixed effects in 
Column (7), which eliminates all time-invariant at the country level.  It is important to note, 
however, that in the fixed effects specification, the identification of the relationship between 
corruption norms and evasion is being identified through changes in firm-ownership or 21 
 
changes in the corruption levels in a particular country over time.  Changes in corruption 
norms in a home country may manifest themselves in a number of ways.  First, if these 
norms are related to enforcement (corruption norms and the size of the informal sector are 
often strongly correlated) in the home country, they may decrease evasion in the U.S. since it 
would be less likely for these profits to go untaxed in the home country.  Second, turnover in 
the ownership or management of the firm may result in controllers who are more influenced 
by the recent cultural norms than those of the past.
19    In this specification, the estimated 
coefficients on the CPI and its interaction with firm size are smaller, though still highly 
statistically significant.  These results imply that when the corruption level in a country 
increases, firms with owners from that country tend to evade more tax in the US, though 
this effect diminishes with the firm’s size. This is a strong piece of evidence that corruption 
norms have an impact on tax evasion in the United States. 
3.3 Robustness checks 
We estimated a number of additional specifications to test the robustness of these 
results. In this section, we report results from robustness checks that account for tax rate 
differentials, use an alternative corruption measure, use different methods of estimation, 
adjust the Winsorization levels, and use different samples of firms. 
Differentials in corporate tax rates provide firms an incentive to move their tax 
liability to low-tax jurisdictions.  For firms operating subsidiaries in high-tax countries like 
the U.S., lower rates overseas motivate firms to move the recognition of income offshore, 
either to the lower tax jurisdiction of the parent or that of another subsidiary.  Such income 
shifting may lead to larger observed adjustments to tax liability following audit.  To the 
                                                 
19 Countries of foreign controllers in our sample which have some of the largest changes in the Corruption 
Perceptions Index over the 1996-2007 period include Italy, Spain, Argentina, and Belgium, all of which seem 
shifts of over 2.35 points on the ten point scale in the 12 year sample period.   22 
 
extent that corruption norms are correlated with corporate income tax rates, not accounting 
for tax rate differentials is another potential source of bias.  To control for this, we estimate 
our baseline size-interaction model with controls for tax rate differentials between the US 
and the foreign controller’s country, as well as other characteristics of tax system in the 
foreign controller’s country.  Table 5 presents the results. 
 [Table 5 about here] 
Column (1) takes the baseline size-interaction specification and adds the tax rate 
differential, calculated as the top US corporate income tax rate minus the top corporate 
income tax rate in the foreign controller’s country.  The tax differential is significant with a 
positive sign, indicating that a lower foreign tax rate relative to the US rate leads to additional 
tax evasion.  Controlling for tax rate differentials strengthens the measured relationship 
between corruption and tax evasion.  This is what one might expect a priori, as many low 
corruption countries in the OECD have relatively low corporate income tax rate while more 
corrupt countries often have relatively high corporate income tax rates.  Column (2) adds the 
interaction of the tax rate differential with corruption norms, showing the tax rate 
differential to have a positive, though insignificant effect, on evasion and the interaction to 
have a negative and insignificant effect on evasion.   
Columns (3) and (4) allow the effect of tax rate differentials to differ with other 
characteristics of the foreign controller’s country’s tax regime.  Column (3) adds the 
interaction between tax rate differentials and a worldwide tax system.  In this specification, 
the coefficient on the rate differential retains it positive sign, but the interaction term is 
negative.  This suggests that rate differentials matter less in the case of the foreign 
controller’s country having a worldwide tax regime than if a territorial system were in place.  
However, this relationship is less strong if the foreign controller’s country has a higher level 23 
 
of corruption. Under a territorial system, the effect of evading U.S. tax may be stronger as 
U.S.-earned income will not be subject to a tax in the parent’s home country.  In addition, in 
a worldwide system, tax credits are often given for taxes paid in other counties, therefore 
reducing taxes paid in the home country and again reducing the incentive to avoid U.S. taxes. 
In Column (4), when the interaction of the tax rate differential and an indicator variable for 
tax havens is included, the tax rate differential loses its significance, and while the dummy 
variable for tax haven is negative, the interaction with tax haven and corruption norms is 
positive and significant.
20  The likely reasons for the sign and significance levels of the 
variables are the high correlation between tax rate differentials and tax havens and the 
importance of other characteristics of tax havens such as lower amounts of information 
sharing, which may be exploited to a greater degree by those with higher corruption norms.  
The coefficients on Corruption Perceptions Index and its interaction with firm size remain 
essentially the same in all three specifications.   
In Table 6, we estimate our models with an alternative corruption measure.  To this 
point, our analysis has used a corruption measure based on the Corruption Perception Index 
published annually by Transparency International. To ensure that the results that we find do 
not depend on this particular measure, we use another measure of corruption, namely the 
Control of Corruption Indicator published by the World Bank as part of the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators Project, and report the results of the estimation using this alternative 
measure of corruption with all possible controls. The magnitudes of the effects are different 
from those reported in Table 4 because the Control of Corruption is scaled differently from 
the Corruption Perception Index. Using this alternative measure, corruption again has a 
                                                 
20 Tax havens are identified as countries with low corporate income tax rates, no requirement for a substantive 
local presence and no effective information exchange with other tax authorities.  In our sample, this includes 
countries such as Panama, Switzerland, Singapore, and Ireland, among others. 24 
 
consistently positive effect on tax evasion, which diminishes as a firm’s size increases. In 
addition, the estimates are strongly significant across all specifications, suggesting that the 
findings are not due the particular use of the Corruption Perception Index.  
[Table 6 about here] 
In Table 7, we try three alternative estimation methods.  As noted above, our main 
specification is a Tobit model, which follows Hanlon, Mills and Slemrod (2007). This is due 
to the fact that many firms have zero audit adjustments and based on an assumption that 
negative tax adjustments are mainly due to unintentional mistakes of tax filers. One may 
argue that some positive tax adjustments are also due to unintentional mistakes. If this is the 
case, we may not need to censor the tax adjustment variable at zero, and OLS may be 
appropriate. We report the results of the OLS model in Column (1). The effects are highly 
significant and consistent with the Tobit model. The marginal effects from OLS are similar 
to the unconditional marginal effects we find using a Tobit model.  
[Table 7 about here] 
An alternative approach to estimation would take advantage of the fact our data 
consists of a panel of firms. Since there is little change in either the ownership of firms over 
time, we cannot employ a firm fixed effects model.
21 Therefore, a remaining approach for 
these panel data is to run a between-effects model. The between-effects model essentially 
averages out observations from the same firm, thus addressing potential autocorrelation 
among them. We report the results of the between-effects model in Column (2) of Table 7. 
The between-effect estimator, like the OLS estimator, results in strongly significant estimates 
of the effect of corruption on tax evasion in the consistent direction with our base 
                                                 
21 In addition, the mean number of times a firm is in the sample is only 1.7, and thus many firms are dropped 
from the estimation sample when fixed effects are included.  Furthermore, a firm-level fixed effect may be 
inappropriate if cultural norms are persistent. 25 
 
specification.   Our final alternative estimator uses a binary dependent variable indicating 
whether the firm has a positive deficiency (after an audit) or not.  Running a Probit model 
using such a dependent variable eliminates two concerns: (i) whether we should censor the 
data; and (2) whether the ratio of tax deficiency over revenue is a good measure of tax 
evasion.  Results from the Probit model are available in Column (3).  These results show that 
coefficients on the corruption level and it’s interaction with firm size retain their size and 
strong significance in a binary model. 
In Table 8, we report results from our main specification when other Winsorization 
levels are used.  All of the analyses above used 90% Winsorization for all monetary variables, 
by setting observations below the 5
th percentile to the 5
th percentile, and observations above 
the 95
th percentile to the 95
th percentile. This is a typical strategy to address the problem of 
outliers, and is necessary because the raw data from CDW includes a number of erroneous 
entries that have extreme values. When the data are not Winsorized, the estimates become 
extremely large, indicating the problem of erroneous entries that we mentioned above. 
Further, reducing the level of Winsorization from 90% to 98% actually enlarges both the 
main and interaction effects of corruption on tax evasion. Although increasing it to 80% 
reduces the point estimates, the effects remain strongly significant. This indicates that the 
main findings above are not sensitive to the choice of Winsorization level. 
[Table 8 about here] 
Our sample thus far includes only firms that were foreign-controlled corporations 
during at least one year of our sample period, and so excludes firms that are consistently 
owned by U.S. citizens. It is possible that the exclusion of US-owned firms in the sample 
could affect the results.  In Column (1) of Table 9 we report the estimation on the full 
sample that includes both U.S. and foreign-controlled firms. Adding U.S. firms increase the 26 
 
sample size by around 11 times but maintains the main findings. The point estimates in the 
full sample are smaller than those of the foreign sample but they are still strongly significant. 
Further, our sample includes only firms incorporated in the US (Form 1120 filers) 
and not those incorporated overseas (Form 1120F filers). In Columns (2) and (3) in Table 9, 
we test whether the results differ when firms incorporated overseas are added to the sample, 
and the corruption measure of the country of incorporation is used instead of the country of 
the owner.  In Column (2), we include all firms, whether they are incorporated in the U.S. or 
in a foreign country.  In this specification, both the main effect of the CPI and the CPI 
interacted with firms’ size switch sign compared to our main specification, and neither is 
significant.  However, this sample is dominated by firms incorporated in the U.S. To avoid 
such a concentration, in Column (3), we run the main specification on the subsample of 
firms that are incorporated outside of the U.S. Although the point estimates are somewhat 
different, the pattern is the same as in our main specification. Corruption norms increase tax 
evasion but this effect diminishes as the firms’ size increases, and both estimates are 
significant despite a very small sample that includes only 585 observations. Thus, the norms 
of the country of incorporation also appear to influence tax evasion.   
[Table 9 about here] 
The stable pattern of the main regression results in all of these tests suggest that 
corruption norms have a robust and strong effect on tax evasion, and this effect diminishes 
as the size of the firm increases. 
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4. Effects of enforcement  
In early 2000s, the IRS implemented two major measures against corporate tax 
evasion, namely the 2002 passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the tax year 2004 
introduction of schedule M-3. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act increased penalties for non-
compliance and requires the company’s CEO to sign off on the firm’s tax return, among 
other changes. The addition of schedule M-3 to Form 1120 requires the firm to report much 
more detail on book-tax differences than had been asked for previously.  These new 
regulations have the potential to affect tax evasion through increased penalties or an 
increased probability of detection due to additional disclosures of tax positions. 
An important question is whether these enforcement measures reduce tax evasion by 
firms owned by individuals from corrupt countries. To answer this question, we employ a 
difference-in-difference estimation strategy. Specifically, we create indicator variables for a 
firm being affected by each of these measures in the years in which they applied,
22 along with 
their interaction with the CPI measure.  These results are presented in Table 10. 
Columns (1)-(2) include the Sarbanes-Oxley and Schedule M-3 indicators 
separately
23, while Column (3) includes both of these measures of enforcement.  In Columns 
(1)-(2), each of the enforcement measures enter with the expected signs – implementation of 
the measure leads to decreased tax deficiencies found upon audit, though the effect is 
smaller for firms with owners from more corrupt countries.  In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley 
and its interaction with CPI, and the interaction of Schedule M-3 with CPI, are statistically 
                                                 
22 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act applied to public firms in 2002 and later, the addition of Schedule M-3 to form 1120 
applied to firms with assets greater than $10 million in 2004 and later.   We also attempted to ascertain the 
effect of the 2006 adoption of FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), the 2003 JGTRRA dividend tax cuts and 
the 2001 accounting scandals, but found no significant effects 
23 Since Schedule M-3 applied only to firms with assets greater than $10 million, in specifications that include 
the Schedule M-3 indicator, we also include an indicator for the firm reporting assets in excess of $10 million. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was applied to public firms. We have already included the indicator for this characteristic 
throughout all specifications. 28 
 
significant.  When both measures are entered into the regression in Column (3), the pattern 
of significance remains.  Overall, these results seem to suggest that these two 
enforcement/reporting measures led to declines in tax deficiencies, though the effect was 
weaker among firms with owners from more corrupt countries.  In addition, the direct effect 
of the corruption index and its interaction with firms’ size are qualitatively similar to those 
found in Table 4.       [Table 10 about here]. 
Another important measure of enforcement that the IRS uses to fight tax evasion is 
to increase the probability of audit.  A recent study by Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff (2011) 
indicates that this measure has a significant effect on corporate tax evasion. From this 
paper’s perspective, it would be intriguing to see if increased audit probability has differential 
effects on firms with different corruption norms.  Thus, in Table 10 we add two different 
year-specific measures of the audit rate (by firms’ size, and by firms’ size and state) along 
with their interactions with the CPI measure.  The results reported in columns (4) and (5) 
show that higher audit rates are again associated with lower tax deficiencies found upon 
audit, that this effect is attenuated for firms with owners from more corrupt countries, and 
that the direct effect of the corruption index and its interaction with firms’ size are 
qualitatively similar to those found in Table 4. 
Taken together, these results suggest that IRS measures are effective in reducing 
corporate tax evasion. However, these measures appear consistently less effective for firms 
with owners from more corrupt countries. In addition, the direct effect of the owner’s 
corruption norms on tax evasion remains consistently stable after the implementation of 
these measures.
24  
                                                 
24 Nonetheless, we consider this result as tentative evidence for the efficacy of enforcement measures against 
tax evasion by firms with corrupt norms. A rigorous analysis of the issue will be presented in DeBacker, Heim 
and Tran (2011). 29 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper studies the link between social norms, law enforcement and illicit 
corporate behavior. We find evidence that corporations with owners from more corrupt 
countries are more likely to evade tax in the U.S., particularly when the firm is smaller (as 
measured by total assets). The result extends the previously known influence of corruption 
norms on individual behavior (Fisman and Miguel 2007) to an important organizational 
behavior.  
We observe that as the size of the firm increases, the influence of corruption norms 
diminishes. This finding appears somewhat in contrast to Joulfaian (2000), who finds that 
managers’ preferences for individual income tax evasion influenced corporate tax evasion, 
but that this influence did not vary with the firm’s size. However, it is important to note that 
the current study examines owners, while Joulfaian (2000) examines managers, suggesting 
that the influence of owners decreases with a firm’s size, while the influence of managers 
does not. Taken together, these results imply that the stronger separation of ownership and 
control in larger firms may attenuate the influence of corruption norms of owners. Putting 
the different pieces of evidence together helps us to better understand the corporate 
governance ‘black-box’ and the propensity of corporations to engage in illicit activities. 
Contrary to Fisman and Miguel (2007), who show that diplomats from corrupt 
countries cut their illegal parking immediately when the law enforcement increased, we find 
that corruption norms pose a challenge in combatting corporate tax evasion: firms with 
higher corruption norm are less likely to respond to increased enforcement activities. This 
difference suggests that individuals and organizations may react to enforcement quite 
distinctively. While there might be various reasons for this difference, we can be certain that 30 
 
cultural factors should be taken seriously in order to design effective law enforcement 
programs.  
Our paper has certain limitations. Although the operation of foreign owned firms in 
the U.S. provides a unique natural experiment, a number of issues may bias our estimates. 
First, there might be omitted variables at the country level that may drive the results. To 
address this concern, as in Fisman and Miguel (2007), we controlled for many country 
specific variables (including country fixed effects) that may possibly correlate with both 
corruption and U.S. tax evasion, but other unobserved time-variant factors may remain that 
could bias our results.   Second, we cannot fully utilize our panel and include firm-specific 
fixed effects, as the firm’s ownership variables change very little during the period of study.  
Furthermore, we only observe a firm’s tax deficiency when it is audited, which, for most 
firms, is not a frequent event.  Thus our ability to identify the role of corruption through 
within firm variation is very limited. Lastly, the non-random selection of our sample may 
lead to selectivity bias. We use different characteristics of the firms, particularly the IRS’s 
Discriminant Function System score to correct for such possible bias. We believe that this 
should eliminate most of the bias, but it may not account completely for selection.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the relationship between corruption norms and tax 
evasion remain significant and consistent in all specifications indicates a robust linkage 
between norms and corporate illicit activities. Culture appears to play an important role in 
tax evasion, and the current enforcement policies seem less effective in dealing with it. Our 
findings call for the consideration of cultural factors in designing corporate governance and 
law enforcement. In this globalized world, what happens far away may have implications for 
us at home. 
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Audit Adjustment 88.776 91.720 61.189
Audit Adjustment/Total Income * 100 0.671 0.631 1.048
Corruption Index, Country of Owner 2.495 2.293 4.385
Log of Total Income  16.848 16.974 15.674
Log of Net Income  14.982 15.115 13.716
Log of Total Assets  17.758 17.896 16.467
Public 0.121 0.124 0.095
Multinational 0.284 0.294 0.191
Discriminant Function Score 65.854 66.186 62.744
Log of GDP per Capita (PPP) 10.292 10.348 9.627
Log of Bilateral Trade 9.097 9.226 7.436
Log of Distance (Population Weighted) 8.547 8.529 8.762
Industry:
  Agriculture 0.006 0.006 0.005
  Mining 0.013 0.013 0.011
  Utilities 0.004 0.004 0.000
  Construction 0.012 0.013 0.010
  Manufacturing 0.242 0.249 0.171
  Wholesale 0.215 0.200 0.357
  Retail 0.030 0.030 0.037
  Transport 0.025 0.024 0.031
  Information 0.029 0.029 0.024
  Finance 0.205 0.214 0.115
  Real Estate 0.035 0.032 0.054
  Professional 0.080 0.079 0.087
  Administrative 0.011 0.010 0.011
  Education 0.003 0.003 0.002
  Health 0.005 0.005 0.006
  Entertainment 0.008 0.008 0.003
  Hospitality 0.009 0.009 0.015
  Other Services 0.007 0.007 0.010
  Unclassified 0.064 0.065 0.053
Number of Observations 25,541 23,080 2,461
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Note: This table reports the means of all variables used in this research. Data from 1996-2007 Audit Information 
Management System merged with corporate tax returns.  This dataset include 25,541 audits of foreign-controlled 
corporations. All dollar values are in constant 2009 dollars.  Audit Adjustments are in 1000s of dollars.  To deal 
with outliers, all monetary variables have been 90% Winsorized.  Corruption Index is the Corruptions Perception 
Index in the reversed scale, published annually by Transparency International.N Mean Std Dev % Of Taxes Owed
All 25,541 79.99 234.52 12.46%
Audit Adjustment < 0 4,200 -53.37 59.35 -2.68%
Audit Adjustment > 0 10,897 208.29 313.39 27.22%
Audit Adjustment = 0 10,444 0.00 0.00 0.00%
Note: Data from 1996-2007 Audit Information Management System merged with corporate tax returns.  All 
dollar values are in 1000s of 2009 $.  To deal with outliers, audit adjustments have been 90% Winsorized.
Table 2. Audit Adjustment Sample StatisticsAll Firms Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption Index (CPI) 0.093*** 0.189*** 0.119*** 0.007 -0.108**
(0.021) (0.041) (0.037) (0.041) (0.043)
ln(Total Assets) -0.086*** -0.196*** -0.224** -0.056 0.294***
(0.014) (0.045) (0.100) (0.072) (0.087)
DIF Score -0.000* 0.001* -0.000 -0.001** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public -0.187** -3.420 -0.347 -0.298** -0.036
(0.087) (2.420) (0.370) (0.136) (0.104)
Multinational 0.203*** -0.177 0.222* 0.068 0.117
(0.062) (0.436) (0.129) (0.094) (0.085)
Foreign Controlled Corp. -0.311*** -1.921*** -0.123 0.078 0.161
(0.078) (0.273) (0.145) (0.115) (0.103)
Agriculture -0.494 -0.916 -0.853 -0.495 0.738
(0.364) (0.842) (0.633) (0.583) (0.501)
Mining 1.009*** -0.085 1.565*** -0.818** 1.600***
(0.234) (0.705) (0.499) (0.343) (0.334)
Utilities 0.259 -2.719* 0.001 0.714 0.209
(0.362) (1.605) (0.731) (1.233) (0.340)
Construction 1.330*** 1.498*** 0.233 1.142** 2.665***
(0.299) (0.571) (0.512) (0.553) (0.846)
Wholesale -0.052 0.051 -0.048 -0.047 -0.365**
(0.072) (0.240) (0.109) (0.114) (0.144)
Retail -0.437*** -0.758* -0.281 -0.684** -0.499***
(0.153) (0.442) (0.257) (0.271) (0.168)
Transportation 0.176 0.550 0.335 -0.611* -0.315
(0.177) (0.399) (0.340) (0.330) (0.223)
Information -0.359** -1.238** -0.298 -0.433 0.261
(0.151) (0.484) (0.288) (0.264) (0.221)
Finance 0.149** 0.284 -0.269 -0.020 0.063
(0.073) (0.428) (0.171) (0.121) (0.093)
Real Estate 0.863*** 2.245*** -0.239 0.439 0.239
(0.193) (0.444) (0.281) (0.379) (0.398)
Professional Services -0.224** -0.692** -0.456** 0.280 0.189
(0.113) (0.300) (0.189) (0.217) (0.249)
Administrative Services -0.265 -1.366** -0.077 -0.606 0.552
(0.273) (0.690) (0.367) (0.483) (0.569)
Education 0.865* 0.674 2.267** -0.695 0
(0.491) (0.857) (0.930) (0.747) 0
Health Care 0.386 0.586 -0.157 1.017 -0.123
(0.330) (0.882) (0.500) (0.775) (0.388)
Entertainment 0.388 -0.330 1.001 0.505 0.035
(0.349) (0.744) (0.621) (0.510) (0.468)
Table 3. Estimation of Relationship Between Corruption Index and Audit AdjustmentAll Firms Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hospitality 0.142 0.355 -0.312 -0.460 0.507
(0.296) (0.590) (0.464) (0.449) (0.708)
Other Services -0.633** -1.440** 0.213 -0.558 -2.558***
(0.287) (0.681) (0.470) (0.418) (0.901)
Misc-Unclassified 0.428*** 1.434*** -0.084 -0.325 0.082
(0.123) (0.338) (0.269) (0.223) (0.165)
1996 0.336*** 0.543 -0.036 0.566*** 0.046
(0.112) (0.347) (0.199) (0.171) (0.191)
1997 0.047 -0.154 -0.137 0.322 -0.043
(0.122) (0.376) (0.229) (0.197) (0.209)
1998 0.012 -0.263 -0.358 0.204 -0.013
(0.121) (0.372) (0.235) (0.187) (0.214)
1999 0.070 0.052 -0.283 -0.064 -0.075
(0.129) (0.387) (0.254) (0.212) (0.231)
2000 0.112 0.033 -0.569* 0.055 -0.059
(0.149) (0.456) (0.293) (0.262) (0.274)
2001 0.122 1.029* -0.237 0.214 -0.357
(0.156) (0.572) (0.291) (0.273) (0.254)
2002 -0.055 -0.601 -0.112 0.261 -0.303
(0.135) (0.472) (0.270) (0.234) (0.218)
2003 0.016 -0.017 -0.049 -0.047 -0.167
(0.126) (0.465) (0.213) (0.192) (0.212)
2004 0.095 0.501 -0.008 -0.186 -0.017
(0.119) (0.413) (0.191) (0.175) (0.203)
2005 0.122 0.145 0.135 0.059 -0.213
(0.120) (0.397) (0.196) (0.193) (0.193)
2006 0.267** 1.126*** 0.005 0.084 -0.041
(0.119) (0.393) (0.189) (0.186) (0.197)
Constant 0.116 1.622** 2.682 -0.309 -6.733***
(0.282) (0.778) (1.719) (1.360) (1.763)
Sigma 3.526*** 5.210*** 3.112*** 2.937*** 2.642***
(0.050) (0.101) (0.098) (0.112) (0.090)
N 25541 6386 6385 6385 6385
Table 3 (cont.) Estimation of Relationship Between Corruption Index and Audit Adjustment
Notes: This table reports the regression results of tax adjustment after the audit (as percent of the firm's revenue) 
on the corruption index of the owner's home country. The results for the full sample and each quartile of firm size 
are reported. Data from 1996-2007 Audit Information Management System merged with corporate tax returns.  All 
dollar values are in constant 2009 $.  To deal with outliers, monetary variables have been 90% Winsorized.  All 















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Corruption Index (CPI) 0.756*** 0.963*** 0.778*** 0.808*** 0.698*** 0.783*** 0.562**
(0.125) (0.183) (0.135) (0.127) (0.134) (0.208) (0.238)
CPI*ln(Total Assets) -0.041*** -0.059*** -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.037*** -0.044*** -0.032***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
ln(Total Assets) 0.022 1.269*** -0.075** -0.557*** -0.389*** -0.180 -0.159
(0.023) (0.391) (0.036) (0.144) (0.077) (0.490) (0.529)
DIF Score -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public -0.196** -0.176** -0.047 -0.122 -0.249*** -0.109 -0.125
(0.087) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088) (0.087) (0.089) (0.088)
Multinational 0.189*** 0.199*** 0.204*** 0.177*** 0.036 0.041 0.029
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061)
Foreign Controlled Corp. -0.335*** -0.592*** -0.542* -0.072 -0.186** 0.748* -30.214***
(0.079) (0.091) (0.291) (0.117) (0.077) (0.387) (11.205)
ln(GDP Per Capita) 1.393** 0.659 5.024***
(0.624) (0.738) (1.241)
ln(GDP PC)*ln(Total Assets) -0.117*** -0.057 -0.036
(0.036) (0.043) (0.049)
ln(Trade) -0.172*** -0.177*** -0.322
(0.055) (0.068) (0.274)




ln(Distance)*ln(Total Assets) 0.070*** 0.039*
(0.017) (0.020)
ln(Net Income) -0.635*** -0.643***
(0.084) (0.088)
ln(Net Income)*ln(Total Assets) 0.034*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.005)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies Yes
Sigma 3.520*** 3.506*** 3.499*** 3.505*** 3.098*** 3.071*** 3.037***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
N 25541 25039 24702 25055 19440 18826 18826
Table 4. Estimation of Relationship Between Corruption Index and Audit Adjustment
Allowing Effect to Differ by Firm Size, With Robustness Checks
Notes: This table reports the regression results of tax adjustment after the audit (as percent of the firm's revenue) on the 
corruption index of the owner's home country. A key variable is the interaction term between CPI and the firm's total asset. 
Column (2) through (6) report different robustness checks.  The country fixed effected model reported in Column 7 is linear 
because the Tobit fixed effect estimator is not available. To deal with outliers, monetary variables have been 90% Winsorized.  










(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption Index (CPI) 0.952*** 0.940*** 0.839*** 0.963***
(0.145) (0.146) (0.158) (0.152)
CPI*ln(Total Assets) -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.049*** -0.052***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
ln(Total Assets) 0.042* 0.042* 0.062** 0.067***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
DIF Score -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public -0.196** -0.195** -0.154 -0.137
(0.087) (0.087) (0.160) (0.160)
Multinational 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.280*** 0.270***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.075) (0.075)
Tax Rate Diff (US-Foreign) 0.012** 0.037 0.123** 0.009
(0.006) (0.039) (0.053) (0.041)
Tax Rate Diff*CPI -0.003 -0.014** -0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Worldwide Tax Regime -0.381**
(0.163)










Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 3.479*** 3.479*** 3.653*** 3.654***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.058) (0.058)
N 24858 24858 19835 19835
Table 5. Estimation of Relationship Between Corruption Index and Audit Adjustment
Allowing Effect to Differ by Firm Size, Controlling for Corporate Tax Rate Differentials
Notes: This table reports the regression results of tax adjustment after the audit (as percent of the firm's revenue) 
on the corruption index of the owner's home country. The key control variables are the characteristics of the 
corporate tax system in the owner's country, including the rate difference with the US, whether it belongs to the 
Worldwide Tax System, an if it is a Tax Heaven.To deal with outliers, monetary variables have been 90% 
Winsorized.  All specifications include year dummies and a constant.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01Base With GDP With Trade With Dist With Income With All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control of Corr. Indicator (CCI) 1.855*** 2.448*** 1.971*** 1.973*** 1.637*** 1.926***
(0.285) (0.406) (0.308) (0.290) (0.306) (0.453)
CCI*ln(Total Assets) -0.101*** -0.148*** -0.107*** -0.104*** -0.088*** -0.109***
(0.017) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025)
ln(Total Assets) 0.019 1.423*** -0.080** -0.571*** -0.387*** -0.068
(0.021) (0.375) (0.035) (0.144) (0.077) (0.471)
DIF Score -0.000* -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public -0.209** -0.189** -0.050 -0.133 -0.258*** -0.110
(0.087) (0.087) (0.090) (0.088) (0.087) (0.089)
Multinational 0.188*** 0.197*** 0.203*** 0.175*** 0.038 0.044
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
Foreign Controlled Corp. -0.336*** -0.574*** -0.556* -0.090 -0.189** 0.711*
(0.078) (0.089) (0.291) (0.116) (0.077) (0.386)
ln(GDP Per Capita) 1.677*** 0.803
(0.602) (0.703)








ln(Distance)*ln(Total Assets) 0.071*** 0.037*
(0.017) (0.020)
ln(Net Income) -0.627*** -0.636***
(0.084) (0.088)
ln(Net Income)*ln(Total Assets) 0.033*** 0.034***
(0.005) (0.005)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 3.520*** 3.505*** 3.498*** 3.505*** 3.107*** 3.098***
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052)
N 25539 25039 24702 25055 19439 18826
Table 6. Estimation of Relationship Between World Bank's Control of Corruption Indicator and Audit 
Adjustment - Allowing Effect to Differ by Firm Size, With Robustness Checks
Notes: This table reports the regression results of tax adjustment after the audit (as percent of the firm's revenue) on 
the corruption index of the owner's home country. A key variable is the interaction term between World Bank's 
Control of Corruption Indicator and the firm's total asset. Column (2) through (6) report different robustness checks.  
To deal with outliers, monetary variables have been 90% Winsorized.  All specifications include year dummies and a 




Corruption Index (CPI) 0.418***   0.413*** 0.121***
(0.074) (0.062) (0.030)
CPI*ln(Total Assets) -0.022***   -0.023*** -0.007***
 (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.002)
ln(Total Assets) -0.043***   -0.047***  0.045***
(0.012)   (0.013) (0.006)
DIF Score -0.000***  -0.000***  0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.032 - -
N 25541 25541 25541
Notes: This table summarizes the estimation results using alternative estimators. These 
specifications are based on our main specification reported in Table 4's Column (1), which uses a 
Tobit estimator. The alternative estimators used in this table are: (i) OLS; (ii) Panel data random-
effects; and (ii) Panel data between-effects. Data from 1996-2007 Audit Information Management 
System merged with corporate tax returns.  All dollar values are in constant 2009 $.  To deal with 
outliers, monetary variables have been 90% Winsorized.  All specifications include year dummies 
and a constant.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01
Table 7. Robusness Check Using Alternate Estimators1% 3% 5% 10% No Winsor
Corruption Index (CPI) 1.633*** 1.010*** 0.756*** 0.402*** 207.367***
(0.308) (0.169) (0.125) (0.074) (80.106)
CPI*ln(Total Assets) -0.087*** -0.054*** -0.041*** -0.022*** -10.815**
(0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (4.289)
ln(Total Assets) 0.117** 0.052* 0.022 -0.003 69.350***
(0.051) (0.030) (0.023) (0.014) (23.002)
DIF Score -0.001 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.061
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074)
Public -0.032 0.007 -0.196** 0.012 4.161
(0.161) (0.097) (0.087) (0.042) (38.756)
Multinational 0.465*** 0.251*** 0.189*** 0.143*** 127.078**
(0.144) (0.082) (0.062) (0.034) (53.851)
Foreign Controlled Corp. -1.289* -0.561 -0.335*** -0.287 -317.175
(0.729) (0.484) (0.079) (0.204) (209.556)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 8.274*** 4.750*** 3.520*** 1.970*** 2538.438***
(0.224) (0.083) (0.050) (0.020) (827.892)
N 25541 25541 25541 25541 25541
Table 8. Robusness Checks Using Different Winsorization Windows
Notes: This table summarizes the estimation results using Winsorization windows. The last column reports the 
results when no winsorization is conducted. These results are not reliable because the raw data includes some 
entry errors with extremely high values. Data from 1996-2007 Audit Information Management System merged 
with corporate tax returns.  All dollar values are in constant 2009 $.  To deal with outliers, monetary variables 
have been 90% Winsorized.  All specifications include year dummies and a constant.  Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01Corruption measure Corruption of 
Country of Owner






Corr Index (CPI) 0.518*** -0.193 1.966*
(0.131) (0.437) (1.020)
CPI *ln(Total Assets) -0.031*** 0.030 -0.093*
(0.008) (0.023) (0.053)
ln(Total Assets) -0.276*** -0.458*** 0.210
(0.020) (0.057) (0.212)
Public 0.315*** 0.417*** -24.972
(0.035) (0.052) (.)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 4.293*** 4.675*** 4.369***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.359)
N 261,871 162,821 585
Corruption of 
Country of Incorporation
Table 9. Robusness Check Using Foreign Owned Firms Only, 
and Corruption Measure of Country of Incoporation
Notes: This table summarizes the estimation results using different samples. Column (1) 
reports the estimation for the full sample of both US- and foreign-controlled firms. This 
column uses the corruption of the country of the owner. In constrast, Column (2) and (3) use 
corruption norms of the country of incorporation.  The All column includes 1120F and 1120 
filers.  Note the number of obs in Column (2) and (3) is less than in Column (1) because the 
CDW only has 1120F filers from 2002 on.  This subsample is almost all US incorporated 
firms.  The dominance of US incorporated firms (who get the corruption index of the US, 
regardless of owner) overwhelm what variation there is in the country of foreign 
incorporation.  Data from 1996-2007 Audit Information Management System merged with 
corporate tax returns.  All dollar values are in constant 2009 $.  To deal with outliers, 
monetary variables have been 90% Winsorized.  All specifications include year dummies and a 
constant.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption Index (CPI) 0.779*** 0.778*** 0.798*** 0.799*** 0.762***
(0.126) (0.128) (0.128) (0.132) (0.130)
CPI*ln(Total Assets) -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.042***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
ln(Total Assets) 0.026 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.054** 0.044*
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
DIF Score -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Public -0.217** -0.237*** -0.261** -0.236*** -0.231***
(0.106) (0.087) (0.106) (0.087) (0.087)
Multinational 0.186*** 0.186*** 0.175*** 0.186*** 0.187***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062)
Foreign Controlled Corp. -0.336*** -0.336*** -0.325*** -0.327*** -0.332***





Total Assets >= $10mm -0.351*** -0.348***
(0.116) (0.117)
Schedule M-3 -0.549*** -0.546***
(0.195) (0.195)
CPI*Schedule M-3 0.113** 0.109**
(0.046) (0.046)
Audit Rate by Size -3.382***
(0.806)
CPI* Audit Rate by Size 0.570*
(0.303)
Audit Rate by Size and State -2.204***
(0.651)
CPI*Audit Rate by Size and State 0.229
(0.238)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 3.520*** 3.516*** 3.515*** 3.517*** 3.517***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
N 25541 25541 25541 25541 25541
Enforcement Initiatives Audit Rates
Notes: This table reports the regression results of tax adjustment after the audit (as percent of the firm's revenue) on the 
treatment of three IRS measures to fight tax evasion. The interaction of these treatments with CPI indicates the 
differential effect on firms with different corruption norms. Data from 1996-2007 Audit Information Management 
System merged with corporate tax returns.  All dollar values are in constant 2009 $.  To deal with outliers, monetary 
variables have been 5% Winsorized.  All specifications include year dummies and a constant.  Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption Index (CPI) 1.294 0.786*** 1.467*** 0.699*** 0.886*** -0.063
(1.304) (0.131) (0.445) (0.148) (0.159) (0.325)
CPI*ln(Total Assets) -0.058 -0.043*** -0.075*** -0.038*** -0.050*** 0.006
(0.064) (0.008) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019)
ln(Total Assets) 0.291* 0.019 0.233*** -0.016 0.042* -0.186*
(0.165) (0.024) (0.055) (0.028) (0.025) (0.101)
DIF Score -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sigma 2.006*** 3.710*** 2.622*** 3.874*** 3.394*** 4.429***
(0.119) (0.054) (0.088) (0.060) (0.053) (0.146)
N 3093 22448 7258 18283 23080 2461
Table 11. Robusness Check Using Sub-samples
Notes: This table summarizes the estimation results using various subsamples. These specifications are based on 
our main specification reported in Table 4's Column (1), which uses a Tobit estimator. Data from 1996-2007 
Audit Information Management System merged with corporate tax returns.  All dollar values are in constant 2009 
$.  To deal with outliers, monetary variables have been 90% Winsorized.  All specifications include year dummies 
and a constant.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<.01Source: Transparency International, 2010
Figure 1. Corruption Perception Index Across the WorldFigure 2. Tax Non-Compliance by Firm Size (Total Assets)
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between firms' size and tax evasion. Each dot represents a 
group of firms in a certain size percentile in terms of total assets. The height of the dot is the mean ratio 
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Percentile of Total Assets
Mean Audit Adjustment/Total Income Fitted Values
Source: Internal Revenue Service
Tax Evasion by Firm Size (Total Assets)Figure 3. Tax Non-Compliance and Corruption
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the home country's corruption of the owners and 
and tax evasion. Each dot represents a group of firms with owners from a certain country. The height 
of the dot is the mean ratio of tax audit adjustment over total income for the group of firms. Data 
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Mean Audit Adjustment/Total Income Fitted Values
Source: Internal Revenue Service, Transparency International
Tax Evasion and CorruptionFigure 4. Tax Non-Compliance and Corruption
Notes: This figure shows the relationship between the corruption levels of the owners' home country 
and and tax evasion. Each line represents a firms in different quartiles, measured by total assets. The 
vertical axis is the mean ratio of tax audit adjustment over total income for the group of firms in a given 
size quartile and with owners whose countries have a certain level of corruption. Data sources: Internal 
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Corruption Index
Quartile 1 Quartile 2
Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Evasion v. Corruption Index, by Firm SizeFigure 5. Corruption, Firms' size and Tax Evasion
Notes: This figure shows the approximate relationship between the home country's corruption of the owners, 
firms' total assets, and predicted tax evasion. It helps to interpret the results of the regression analysis by 
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